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or to the tests which the Commonwealth used to link Spencer to the
murder. There is, however, at least one recent example of successful
employment of the latter line of defense against DNA evidence.
In People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1989), a successful
challenge to the DNA matching test linking Castro to a murder was
made. The evidence linking Castro to the murder victim consisted of
bloodstains on his wristwatch. Castro at 985. Lifecodes Corp.
performed a DNA matching test on DNA from the bloodstains on the
wristwatch and determined that they matched those of the victim. Id.
at 985-6. Castro's attorney, Peter Neufeld, fielded a team of five
expert witnesses to challenge the Lifecodes data. Id. at 986. Eventu-
ally, although the New York Court of Appeals ruled that the DNA
matching test was a valid procedure, it questioned the reliability of
the actual procedure used in this case.
The rule for declaring a measured match must be the
same rule which is used for declaring a match between
the measurements and the data pool. This was not
done In this case. Because of this error, the popula-
tion frequencies reported by Lifecodes In this case
are not generally accepted by the scientific
community. This mistake might have been corrected
by remeasuring the bands, rematching them to the data
pool, and then recalculating the allele frequencies.
However, this procedure was not undertaken In
this case. Accordingly, the statistical probabilities
noted would have been precluded or substantially
redued ...
Castro at 998 (emphasis added). The New York Court of Appeals
found that this rendered the results so unreliable that they were
"inadmissible as a matter of law." Id. at 999.
Castro illustrates the dangers inherent in "infallible" methods
of identification. No analytical technique is any more reliable than
the technician performing the procedure or the sample being
analyzed. Further, the more complicated the procedure, the greater
the need for safeguards to ensure reliability. An article in the
December 1989 issue of Student Lawyer (Williams, "Conviction by
Chromosome," p. 26) quotes Edward Lander, an expert witness for
the defense in Castro, on the need for greater reliability in forensic
testing: "At present, forensic science is virtually unregulated - with
the paradoxical result that clinical laboratories must meet higher
standards to be allowed to diagnose strep throat than forensic labs
must meet to put a defendant on death row."
Ultimately, concentration on the reliability of particular,
complicated forensic testing showed in Castro that Lifecodes' own
test results excluded defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. Castro
at 998.
It is suggested that Virginia attorneys faced with DNA
matching test evidence study the Castro opinion. Although highly
technical, it provides a readable and detailed explanation of the entire
matching procedure and illustrates how the procedures were
successfully challenged in that particular case. The opinion also lists
numerous articles and learned treatises upon the subject. For these
reasons it is an excellent starting place for research.
CRITICAL POINTS IN THE PROGRESS OF A CAPITAL CASE
By: Elizabeth A. Bennett
I. Introduction
In the progress of capital as compared with non-capital tfials,
there are points at which the capital trial presents unique challenges
and responsibilities for defense counsel. In addition, there are points
where the importance of matter also present in non-capital trials is
enhanced. This article does not undertake exhaustive treatment of
those points, it merely identifies them-some are also discussed
elsewhere in this issue.
I1. Pretrial Motions: Unique Resource Requirements In
Capital Cases.
A. Securing Time and Resources
1. Mental Mitigation
a. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1 (Supp. 1989).
This section provides for the mandatory appointment of a
mental health expert upon a showing that defendant is indigent and
either has been charged with or convicted of capital murder. The
function of the mental health expert is to evaluate the capital
defendant and to assist in the preparation and presentation of
evidence in mitigation to be presented during the sentencing phase of
the trial. An alternative means of securing the assistance is to obtain
appointment under the Constitutional authority originating in Ake v.
Oklahoma'. Under Ake, however, a substantial showing is required
by the defendant. The burden of making this showing must be
weighed against the significant disadvantages which arise when
defendant moves under § 19.2-264.3:1. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-
264.3:1 compels a capital defendant to waive his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination by submitting to examination by
an expert appointed for the Commonwealth, furnish that expert with
reports containing statements made by the defendant to his expert, or
face possible preclusion of the testimony of his expert2 at the capital
penalty trial.
b. Ake v. Oklahoma
1. Introduction
As will be seen in the following sections, Ake is not only
authority for securing expert mental mitigation assistance, but may
also authorize other expert assistance deemed to constitute "basic
tools" of an effective defense.
While the showing required under Ake is substantial, counsel
should be permitted to make it exparte. This is premised upon the
fact that this showing cannot be made without revealing defense
theories or other privileged undiscoverable material to the Common-
wealth. Clearly this information would not be discoverable from a
defendant who could afford to retain his own expert. One benefit of
pursuing the Ake process is that it forces counsel to develop a theory
of mitigation in order to show what defensive matters, particular to
the case, require expert assistance for their preparation and presenta-
tion.
Counsel should consider moving on both constitutional and
statutory grounds. First, counsel could make the Ake motion,
supported by the exparte showing. If appointment is denied, a
motion under § 19.2-264.3:1 could follow, with appropriate objection
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to its preclusion provisions.
2. Essential elements of an Ake motion.
In order to trigger the appointment of an expert, the motion
must allege the "specific facts supporting the costs, terms and
purposes of the experts.'0 Although no bright line test exists, it is
clear that counsel must show that without the assistance of the
requested expert, there could be no fair trial. For example, in Volanty
v. Lynaugh,4 defendant's "bare assertion" that addiction rendered him
temporarily insane was insufficient to make that issue a significant
factor in the case. In that case, counsel failed to offer any supporting
evidence at the pre-trial hearing. However, in Little v. Armontrout S
the 8th Circuit en banc remanded for consideration and determined
that failure to appoint a hypnotist was error. In Little, the only
evidence linking defendant to the crime was the identification from
the victim, made after hypnosis.
Two cases, Messer v. Kemp6 and Moore v. Kemp 7 serve to
illustrate further the showing required. In Messer, the court held that
denial of a motion for expert psychiatric assistance did not deprive
the defendant of a fundamentally fair trial due to three omissions in
the required showing. The motion failed to describe the problems that
could be reasonably anticipated, how the appointment of a psychia-
trist might aid in the defense, and finally, what specific behavior by
the defendant would lead one to conclude that the issue of his mental
health would be an issue in the case.8 Again in Moore, the court
upheld the denial of the appointment of independent experts
requested to examine blood, hair and physical evidence. The court
concluded that counsel failed to "advise the court of the kind of
expert required and [the] role [the] expert would play." 9 The Moore
court continued, requiring that the motion must "create a reasonable
probability that expert assistance was necessary to the defense and
the denial of requested expert assistance would render petitioner's
trial unfair."'I No case has definitively set out the prerequisites for
granting an Ake motion. Post Ake cases suggest, however, that the
following matters are relevant and should be alleged in the motion
and supported with evidence where applicable:
1. The type of expert: Counsel should be specific about
the particular area of expertise needed.
2. The type of assistance: This is an area where one
category does not cover all. Counsel must list each request
with particularity: investigation, testing (medical or
psychological), consultation, whether s/he will testify at
pretrial, the guilt/innocence or sentencing phases, etc.
3. The name of the expert, or qualifications and fee
schedule: If possible, counsel should submit the name of
the expert along with the motion. If unknown, counsel
should include a reference to the fact that defendant is
entitled to an expert as qualified as the one used by the
Commonwealth.
4. Reasonableness of the cost: This can be supported by
providing affidavits from similar experts in the community.
5. Objective bases for the request: Counsel should list all
of the factual reasons for the request as well as the defenses
you need to explore (Legal necessity argument).
6. Subjective bases for the request: It is useful for counsel
to relate any observation made regarding the behavior of
the defendant.
The memorandum in support of the motion for funds for an
expert investigator should include the constitutional authority in
support of the motion. I Selected portions of the arguments that
might be made from that authority are included in the sections that
follow.
3. Motion for Appointment of Expert Investigator,
Forensic Specialist, or Other Essential Expert Witness.
In Ake, recognizing the imbalance between the resources
available to a State versus an indigent defendant, the United States
Supreme Court found that the Constitution required appointment and
payment for the "basic tools of an adequate defense."' 2 Note that the
Court makes clear that its decision does not mean that "the indigent
defendant has a constitutional right to a psychiatrist of his own
personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own."13 The reasoning
in Ake set forth and grounded the right to an expert in the Due
Process Clause. The Court's language acknowledges the reality of the
adversarial setting when discussing the importance of psychiatry in
the courtroom.
[B]y organizing a defendant's mental history,
examination results and behavior, and other
information, interpreting it in light of their
expertise, and then making out their investigative
and analytic process to the jury, the psychiatrists
for each party enable the jury to make its most
accurate determination of the truth on the issue
before them.'
4
Since Ake dealt with the issue of insanity, application to other
expert assistance must be made carefully. Clearly, the allocation of
resources implicates the Sixth Amendment right to the effective
assistance of counsel, a necessary component of Due Process. The
U.S. Supreme Court found in Strickland v. Washington' , that Due
Process requires "meaningful adversarial testing" of the prosecution's
case. Therefore, in the proper case, this Sixth Amendment rationale
also supports the appointment of an expert.
4. Motion for Continuance.
In order to provide the effective assistance of counsel to which
the defendant is entitled, investigation, research and preparation is
required beyond that essential in non-capital cases. Counsel is
required to inquire into every aspect of the history of the accused, his
character, and the circumstances of the offense that might serve as a
basis for a sentence less than death.' 6 Moreover, counsel must
familiarize himself with the constitutional claims which have been
and are being raised in the lower federal courts. If adequate time to
do so is not allowed, defendant will be unable to make and ade-
quately preserve a record of the valid claims which are currently
available to him. 7
Due to the unique nature of the capital trial, extensive
preparation must be made for the sentencing phase of trial in order to
prepare rebuttal of the expected evidence the Commonwealth will
introduce in aggravation as well as develop evidence to provide a
case in mitigation. At the hearing on a motion for continuance,
counsel should ensure through evidence proffered and representations
to the court that the record clearly reflects the need for time to
accomplish each specific task essential to capital defense. The record
should also reflect defendant's contention that the continuance is
required by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Counsel should provide as much of the following evidence to support
the motion as possible. First, all scientific reports which need to be
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analyzed by an expert, including, fingerprinting, handwriting,
autopsies, mental examination by the Commonwealth, blood, urine or
breath tests, semen analysis, DNA fingerprinting, or gas chromatog-
raphy. Second, physical evidence requires analysis by an expert,
including, weapons, ballistics, clothes, hair, blood, and fibers. Third,
the appointment of a mental health expert to show defendant's
history, character, mental condition or results of any neurological
examination conducted on the defendant. Fourth, information
obtained by conducting an independent investigation of all aspects of
the defendant's life. Note that counsel should never limit the
investigation because of lack of cooperation on the part of the
defendant or because the defendant instructs counsel not to investi-
gate or present evidence.' 8
Documentary evidence should contain birth records, school
records, hospital and mental health records, institutional, court,
probation and parole records, and military records. Interview as many
people as possible who have ever known the defendant, including
parents, siblings, relatives, teachers, employers, co-workers, ministers
or other church people, institutional personnel. In essence, include
those persons identified in the records obtained, by the defendant, or
identified by others interviewed.
III. Jury Selection Procedure In Virginia.
This section will discuss problems unique to capital voir dire.
The setting in which that process occurs is also important and can be
affected by pretrial motions. See Plimpton and Lee, Capital Pretrial
Motions: Added Dimensions, this issue.
A. Consideration of Mitigation
Jury selection procedure is typically thought to be within the
discretion of the trial court as a matter of State law. However, due to
the unique requirements of capital cases, the Sixth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution are directly
implicated. Defense counsel must insist that they be allowed the time
and latitude necessary to elicit reliable answers from prospective
jurors. The applicable standard for removal of a prospective juror for
cause is whether or not the views of the juror would "prevent or
substantially impair the performance of his duties as ajuror in
accordance with his instructions and his oath."' 9 Counsel is entitled
to question prospective jurors about any matter that could prevent or
substantially impair performance according to law. In order to
establish effective voir dire, counsel must be alert to attempts to
"rush" the process, thereby prohibiting necessary questioning. If
opportunity to pursue certain questioning is not allowed, a proper
record must be made.
The Virginia General Assembly has listed five factors to be
considered mitigating on the issue of death or life imprisonment,
although they by no means represent an exhaustive list. Recently, in
Mills v. Maryland", the Supreme Court discussed the line of cases
involving the issue of presentation of mitigation evidence, stating
that:
It is beyond dispute that in a capital case "the
sentencer [may] not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect
of a defendant's character or record and any of
the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death." Eddings v. Oklahorai t , 455 U.S.
104, 110 (1982), quoting Lockett v. Ohio22, 438
U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion) (emphasis in
original).
Therefore, a prospective juror should be disqualifiable if the
factor counsel might present as a reason to choose life rather than
death. Conversely, prospective jurors are not excludable for cause if
they can consider any penalty and all mitigating factors according to
law.23 In Wainwright v. Witt,24 the majority held that the proper
standard for judging qualification of prospective jurors is the
"prevent or substantially impair" language previously announced in
Adams v. Texas"5. Capital voir dire must allow meaningful explora-
tion by counsel of all these matters.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has supported severe limita-
tions on voir dire. Appellate review is often made difficult, however,
because counsel fail to make a proper record of what they propose to
ask and why it is relevant.
Even when a record is made, however, the position of the
Supreme Court of Virginia can only be characterized as restrictive. In
Buchanan v. Commonwealth,2 6 the court stated that, since a criminal
defendant has no right to individual voir dire, it follows that, there is
no right to individual sequestered voir dire. Moreover, durihg voir
dire, Buchanan's counsel sought to ask prospective jurors:
(1) Do you believe that a death sentence is the only
appropriate punishment for capital murder?
In discussing the standard applicable to questions asked during
voir dire, the court held that "to be relevant, a question to a prospec-
tive juror must necessarily disclose or clearly lead to the disclosure
of opinion or prejudice. '27 Finding this question virtually identical
to one properly rejected in Patterson v. Commonwealth2s, the court
held that the question was "vague, argumentative, and non-specific."
Counsel's ability to conduct voir dire meaningfully was further
frustrated in Mackall v. Commonwealth."9 In Mackall, the Supreme
Court of Virginia concluded that counsel could determine whether or
not a juror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the
performance of his duties as ajuror in accordance with his instruc-
tions and his oath" by inquiring as to whether the juror had views on
the propriety of the death penalty but could not inquire into what
those views might be.
B. Exposure to Publicity
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused in a criminal
case the right to a "fair trial" and an "impartial jury.' 30 An impartial
jury need not be an unifonned jury?1 The standard, stated in Irvin v.
Dowd,3" is that ajuror or potential juror must be able to "lay aside
their impression or opinions and render a verdict based on the
evidence presented in court. 3 3 Where pretrial publicity is widespread
and of such a prejudicial nature that a potential juror could not lay
aside his or her personal impressions, an "inference" of actual
prejudice is permissible.3 4 Questions asked during voir dire regarding
pretrial publicity, like those involving the consideration of mitigation
evidence, should not have to be leading or conclusory. However,
another question asked in Buchanan, supra, was:
(1) From what you have read or heard about this case
in the newspapers, what impression do you have about
this case?
The court determined that this question failed to necessarily disclose
or clearly lead to the disclosure of opinion or prejudice because it
was vague and unfocused.
C. Challenging Application of the Capital Statute.
1. Motion to Prohibit the Imposition of the Death
Penalty.
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Two grounds for this motion will be discussed. First, is a
failure to guide the jury's discretion in its consideration of the two
statutory aggravating factors as required under Furman v. Georgia35,
Godfrey v. Georgian, and Maynard v. Cartwright"7. Second, that
failure to give the jury adequate instructions on mitigation, use of
model jury instructions, and jury verdict forms inhibits the jury from
giving independent weight to aspects of the defendant's character and
record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation, in
violation of Lockett and Mills.
Sections 19.2-264.2 through 19.2-264.5 of the Code of
Virginia, as amended 1950, violate the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
a. Virginia's "vileness predicate" falls to guide jury
discretion as required by Furman, Godfrey, and
Maynard.
The Supreme Court interprets post-Furman statutes with the
understanding that the qualitative difference of death demands a
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determina-
tion that death is the appropriate punishment? s The Brown court
determined that the "sentencers may not be given unbridled
discretion in determining the fates of those charged with capital
offenses." 39 In Godfrey, the jury sentenced the defendant to death
upon a finding of the vileness aggravating factor. The Supreme Court
held that the aggravating factor could not constitutionally support the
death verdict because it created the uncontrolled discretion of a
basically uninstructed jury.40 Virginia's vileness predicate is based
upon the same one found in Godfrey. Although the Supreme Court of
Virginia purportedly placed a limiting instruction on the vileness
predicate, in practice the construction not only fails to save the defect
condemned in Godfrey and Maynard v. Cartwright, but aggravates
the problem by confusing the jury and inviting an unguided and
standardless verdict.
b. Virginia's future dangerousness predicate fails to
guide jury discretion as required by Furman and Gregg
v. Georgia4' resulting in the arbitrary imposition of the
death penalty.
Under the Virginia sentencing procedure section 19.2-264.4,
the jury may impose the death sentence if it finds a probability
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant "would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious
threat to society." Courts in Virginia have allowed the use of prior
unadjudicated criminal conduct evidence to establish this predicate.
Use of this conduct without any requirement that the conduct be
established by any standard of proof violates the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments. Moreover, use of this evidence also violates
Godfrey and Cartwright by giving the jury open ended discretion in
deciding when the proof has risen to a level necessary to establish the
prior criminal conduct. Once this determination is made, the jury is
given "guidance" that it must determine the probability of the future
dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby allowing the
jury to impose the punishment of death in an arbitrary and capricious
manner.
IV. Penalty Trial
Obviously, the penalty trial is no more important than trial on
guilt or innocence of capital murder. A greater number of issues
unique to capital Cases appear, of course, because penalty trials
themselves are not part of Virginia criminal practice (see generally,
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-295).
A. Relevance of Evidence
Only evidence tending to show a greater degree of individual
moral culpability in the defendant than that demonstrated by the
commission of capital murder itself is properly admissible in support
of aggravating factors.
In Booth v. Maryland4 the United States Supreme Court held
that the use of a victim impact statement during the penalty phase of
a capital trial was improper for two reasons. First, it focused on the
victim, and second, on "factors about which the defendant was
unaware, and that were irrelevant to the decision to kill."44 The Court
held that the admission of irrelevant evidence "creates a constitution-
ally unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the death penalty in
an arbitrary and capricious manner." s Moreover, in reaching this
conclusion the Court reasoned that the admission of such evidence
could promote arbitrary findings by: (1) "diverl[ing] the jury's
attention away from the defendant's background... and the
circumstances of the crime"; and (2) by the random variations of each
family's communicative abilities "in expressing their grief.'" 6
In South Carolina v. Gathers,4 7 the Booth type of error
occurred during the prosecution's closing argument. The prosecutor
focused on positive aspects of the victim's character by reference to a
laminated prayer and voter registration card. The Court held that this
evidence was irrelevant to the sentencing decision. Adding that "the
content of the various papers ... was purely fortuitous, and cannot
provide any information relevant to the defendant's moral culpability
... [and] their content cannot be said to relate directly to the
circumstances of the crime." 4 In Virginia, two questions must be
considered. What is relevant to show the "vileness" predicate and
what is relevant to the issue of "future dangerousness". The United
States Supreme Court has determined that on their face, both
questions are relevant to ultimate life or death verdict but left
unanswered is the question of what evidence is relevant to show these
factors. As to what evidence is relevant to show future dangerous-
ness, two Virginia statutes are in direct conflict. Section 19.2-264.2
limits the evidence to the defendant's past criminal record, stating:
a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless ...
the jury shall (1) after consideration of the past
criminal record of convictions the defendant...
While § 19.2-264.4(C) allows consideration of:
... evidence of the prior history of the defendant
or of the circumstances surrounding the commis-
sion of the offense...
The 4th Circuit, in Giarratano v. Procunier,49 recently held
that the use of different language in these sections is insignificant.
B. Objections to Standard Jury Instructions and Forms
1. Failure to give adequate instructions on mitigation,
use of model jury instructions, and jury verdict form
inhibit the jury from giving independent mitigating
weight to aspects of the defendant's character and
record and to circumstances of the offense proffered In
mitigation, In violation of Lockett and Mills.
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a. The Virginia Courts' practice of failing adequately to
instruct on mitigation, and the use of Incomplete and
misleading forms and instructions violates Lockett.
The issue at this point in the penalty trial is whether Virginia's
use of model jury instructions and forms, and practice of failing to do
more than barely mention mitigation underinforms, misleads, or
otherwise inhibits consideration of mitigation evidence in a manner
required by law. The Court must focus on the combined effect of
these practices from the perspective of a reasonable juror, not a
reviewing court.5° Therefore, the failure adequately to instruct on
mitigation and the use of jury instructions and forms combines to
create a Lockett violation of the sentencing process.
51
b. The courts use of jury forms and model jury
instructions result in an Impermissible barrier to the
sentencer's consideration of all mitigation evidence in
violation of Lockeit, Hitchcock v. Dugger 52 Eddings v.
Oklahoma5 3 and Skipper v. South Carolinas4.
The Court has repeatedly held that it is not relevant whether
the barrier to the sentencer'9 consideration of all mitigating evidence
is interposed by statute,55 by the sentencing court,56 or by an
evidentiary ruling." Whatever the cause, the conclusion is the same
"because the [sentencer's] failure to consider all of the mitigating
evidence risks erroneous imposition of the death sentence in plain
violation of Lockett, it is our duty to remand this case for resen-
tencing." '5 Accordingly, Virginia's practice and the use of model jury
instructions and forms erects the same impermissible barrier to
consideration of mitigating evidence as that condemned in Mills.
C. Proposed Jury Instructions.
The following discussion of three proposed jury instructions
on the subject of evidence in mitigation, consideration of evidence in
aggravation and mitigation, and parole law are examples of issues
that should be litigated on federal grounds, in Virginia penalty trjals.
It is also important for counsel to realize that proposed instructions
should be accompanied by an objection to the use of Virginia's
standard jury instructions.
1. Evidence in Mitigation
First, the jurors should be informed that they are required to
consider any evidence that has been presented in mitigation5 9
Furthermore, that mitigation evidence is not offered as an excuse for
the crime of which the defendant has already been found guilty.
Rather it is any evidence which in fairness may serve as a basis for a
sentence less than death. The instruction should inform the jury that
the law requires consideration of more than the bare facts of the
crime. A recitation of the statutory mitigating factors should be
included for exemplary purposes, as well as a charge that the juror
must consider a mitigating circumstance if evidence is found to
support it, whether expressly mentioned in the statute or not. Finally,
the instruction should include language explaining that the weight
accorded a particular circumstance is within the judgment of the
jurors, but that they may not refuse to consider any evidence
presented in mitigation. Counsel will find support for this jury
instruction in the Eighth and Feurteenth Amendments, Lockett v.
Ohio, supra, Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra, Skipper v. South
Carolina", Hitchcock v. Dugger1, and Penry v. Lynaugh62.
2. Consideration of Evidence in Aggravation and
Mitigation.
The jurors are instructed that before they may fix the punish-
ment at death, they must find, unanimously and beyond a reasonable
doubt, the existence of at least one of the statutory the aggravating
circumstances. Here, the key fact for the jurors to understand is that
they are not required to reach a unanimous decision, nor find
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any particular fact in
mitigation. The jurors should be instructed that under the law, they
are permitted to fix the punishment of the defendant at life if they
find that to be the appropriate sentence, even if they find unani-
mously and beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the aggravat-
ing circumstance. The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Smith v.
Commonwealth63, Mills v. Maryland64, and Penry v. Lynaugh 5
provide support for this instruction.
3. Parole Eligibility Jury Instruction.
Despite the Virginia Supreme Court's current prohibition
against parole eligibility jury instructions, 6 the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments support an allowance for such instructions. The
Virginia Court has based its prohibition on two rationales. The first is
a fear that juries will "handicap" the sentence rather than imposing a
just punishment for defendant's crime.67 Simply put, the Court fears
that the jury will lengthen the sentence to compensate for a defen-
dant's possible "good time" or parole consideration." The second
rationale is a separation of powers theory first discussed in Hinton v.
Commonwealth.6 9
In Hinton, the Supreme Court of Virginia determined it is the
executive's role to mete out punishment via the correctional system
while it is the judiciary's role (via the jury) to fix the penalty.
Allowing the jury in Hinton to consider matters pertaining to the
course of punishment rather than focusing their consideration to
determining the appropriate punishment violated the separation of
powers.70 The first rationale is obviously inapplicable in capital cases
since the jurors determine life or death and cannot "handicap".
Despite this view, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
entitle a capital defendant to these jury instructions for two reasons.
The first function of a parole eligibility instruction is to provide the
jury with criteria for a sentence less than death. I It has already been
shown that due process requirements dictate that a capital defendant
may not be precluded from presenting any evidence in mitigation of
his crime(s). Accurate information about the severity of the life
imprisonment penalty is part of such mitigatory evidence, and
necessary to rational consideration of whether that punishment is
appropriate in a given case.
The second function of accurate parole information is to
provide rebuttal to the Commonwealth's future dangerousness case.
72
Since a life sentence permanently separates the defendant from all but
prison society, he cannot pose a future threat to society as a whole.
Additionally, due process and the prohibition against the arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty require that the judicial system afford
a defendant the opportunity effectively to rebut any aggravating
factors upon which the Commonwealth relies. Accurate parole
information is part of rebuttal of the Commonwealth's future
dangerousness case. The following eligibility provisions should be
made part of proposed jury instructions as applicable in a particular
case:
As you deliberate whether life in prison or death is the
appropriate punishment for the defendant's crime(s),
you may consider as a possible mitigating factor that a
sentence of life in prison means the defendant will:
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1. not be eligible for parole.
2. not be eligible for parole consideration for
twenty-years.
3. not be eligible for parole consideration for
thirty years.
When you assess the evidence presented by the Common-
wealth in support of its contention of [future dangerous-
ness], you may consider the fact that if you set defendant's
punishment at life imprisonment, he will:
[Insert eligibility provision applicable to your case]
1. not be eligible for parole.
2. not be eligible for parole consideration for
twenty-years.
3. not be eligible for parole consideration for
thirty years.
D. Investigation and Presentation of Mitigation
Since the time of the penalty trial is to commence "as soon as
practicable' ' 3 after the guilt phase, investigation of mitigation
evidence must begin pre-trial. From the beginning, counsel should be
aware that this phase involves a comprehensive and time-consuming
process. While it is comprehensive in terms of the hours spent in
investigation, more importantly, as the investigation progresses,
counsel must develop a theory of mitigation. Although each case
presents a unique "paper trail" of documents, the following represents
portions of a checklist 74 designed to provide a starting point to
investigation of the defendant's life.
Pre-natal, birth, post-partem medical records
Obtain mother's notarized release for all medical
records. Look for. medications taken during preg-
nancy, illnesses, medical complications or trauma.
Other medical records
All hospital, physician records and social service
records. Look for: physical trauma, abuse or neglect
complaints, disease, or accident.
Siblings, immediate and extended family
Birth, death, school records, criminal or military
records. Look for: a history of mental, emotional or
physical problems as well as substance abuse.
School records, Juvenile and military records
Psychological, achievement testing, names of teachers,
counselors, IQ scores or other test results and discipli-
nary reports.
Employment records
Look for job description and work history.
Criminal record, prison records
Review the complete file of any prior arrests, convic-
tions as well as psychiatric evaluation, probation and
parole reports.
Once names are obtained, counsel should interview friends,
relatives, employers, co-workers, school personnel, and clergy to
obtain information to develop a theory in mitigation. Although also
unique to a particular defendant, the theory may involve a history of
abuse or neglect, mental retardation, or control or domination of the
defendant at an early age. Counsel may be able to trace defendant's
life back to a critical or turning point from which defendant never
recovered. In all, counsel should provide as thorough an investigation
as possible and be receptive to the development of a theory of
mitigation as the case progresses.
E. Closing Arguments.
In Zant v. Stephens,75 the Court suggested certain aggravating
factors which prosecutors could not make out by evidence or
argument. The first involves the area of constitutionally protected
conduct. If the prosecutor alludes to "the defendant's fair trial, while
the victim had none" or a failure to testify or cooperate with the
police, an objection must be made. Second, objection should be made
where an attempt is made to argue that a family background depriva-
tion or mental illness bears on the defendant's "future dangerous-
ness". Third, no direct or indirect reference to race, religious or
political affiliation should ever be permitted. Fourth, while the Court
has insisted that all evidence proffered in mitigation be considered by
the jury, equally true is the determination that death sentences be
based upon factors relating to the individual culpability of the
offender." And finally, the prosecutor may not diminish in any way
the jury's ultimate responsibility for the imposition of the death
sentence. 7 Although Virginia counsel are reluctant to interrupt the
argument of opposing counsel, if the prosecutor goes beyond
permissible bounds, an objection must be made.
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CAPITAL PRETRIAL MOTIONS: ADDED DIMENSIONS
By: Thomas W. Plimpton
Kerry D. Lee
Capital cases require some pretrial motions not heard of in
other trials. Also, some pretrial motions found in non-capital cases
take on added importance in capital cases (e.g., motion for change of
venue). Virtually every aspect of a capital trial implicates federal law.
Pretrial motions practice is not the only way to raise federal issues in
a capital trial. However, it is a systematic way whereby defense
counsel may plan with deliberate care to preserve all possibly
meritorious issues on the record should appeal prove necessary. This
article deals with pretrial motions unique to capital cases as well as
motions more generally used but of heightened importance in a
capital case. The article also discusses the timing for filing pretrial
motions and the reasons for filing them.
Pretrial motions in capital cases may serve at least three
distinct functions. First, and most important, granting of the motion
could make the trial fairer. Motions for additional time or resources,
such as requests for experts or investigators, address the tremendous
imbalance in resources between the Commonwealth and appointed
counsel and enhance the opportunity for effective representation of
capital defendants. Second, a meritorious pretrial motion may
preserve an issue on the record for appeal. (Conversely, claims may
be lost if not asserted pretrial). Third, pretrial motions may create
currency for negotiation of a non-capital disposition.
Pretrial motions should be founded upon a good faith basis for
filing. A good faith basis may exist, however, even when it appears
unlikely that the motion will be granted. On the other hand, frivolous
motions or voluminous motions made for effect rather than for the
purpose of obtaining a fairer trial undermine the credibility of
counsel. Credibility is not undermined when voluminous motions
reflect legitimate issues, viably supported and argued.
